We utilize a natural experiment, the Supreme Court"s 1978 Marquette decision which changed the interest rates that credit card companies could legally charge, to explore the impact of credit card availability on black entrepreneurship. Using self employment as a measure of entrepreneurship, we use Current Population Survey data from 1971-1985 to show that increases in rates following the Marquette decision led to increases in self-employment transitions among black individuals. We verify this same pattern using Survey of Consumer Finance data from 1977-1986 and find additional suggestive evidence that credit cards were an important financing tool that may have allowed black entrepreneurs to circumvent discrimination. We conclude with implications for research on entrepreneurship and public policy.
Introduction
Prior research has shown that black entrepreneurs have a harder time accessing finance than white entrepreneurs. There is also evidence that the business financing frictions encountered by black entrepreneurs are due to discrimination when applying for loans. Our paper investigates whether credit cards, which eliminate the need for face-to-face interactions with a loan officer, are a mechanism which black entrepreneurs use to overcome business financing frictions. We accomplish this by evaluating the impact of variation in state level credit card interest rate caps on black transitions into entrepreneurship in the United States.
Exogenous variation in state level interest rate caps comes from the Marquette decision, a 1978
Supreme Court ruling that effectively eliminated state level caps on credit card interest rates for a group of states over several years. After the decision a number of states eliminated caps, allowing credit card companies in states which were previously capped at lower interest rates to charge much higher rates and extend credit to more borrowers. We show that elimination of the caps increases black transitions into self employment. These results are consistent across two different data sets. We also show weak evidence that black individuals who own credit cards in states without caps are more likely to be self employed. We furthermore show that blacks are more likely than whites to be turned down by lenders than whites, and that blacks in states with a history of discrimination are more likely to enter self employment following elimination of caps.
We believe these findings suggest that black individuals face discrimination-based barriers to entrepreneurship and use credit cards as a mechanism to overcome these barriers. We also show that the results are not driven by interstate moves or other state law changes.
In addition to suggesting a mechanism that black entrepreneurs use to overcome discrimination in lending, our paper also adds to a broad literature about how entrepreneurs finance their ventures. While most prior work has examined new ventures supported by outside capital, 1 the vast majority of entrepreneurs are likely to use their own funds, raise money from their friends and family, or borrow money from commercial banks, government, and other sources (Berger and Udell, 1998) . Numerous academic studies have focused on venture capital financing of new ventures (for a review of some of this literature, see Hsu (2001) ), whereas a very small percentage of entrepreneurs actually receive venture capital. 2 The vast majority of entrepreneurs finance their businesses through other means. Often before tapping "friends, families, and fools" or after being turned down for a bank loan, incipient entrepreneurs use credit cards to "bootstrap" a new venture. Indeed, a recent study by MasterCard reported that 57% of small business owners used credit cards to finance their companies (Cole, Lahm Jr., Little Jr., and Seipel, 2005; de Paula, 2003) . Credit cards represent an important source of short term credit, which can be especially valuable to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs face regular cash outflows such as rent and utility bills, vendor bills, and salaries for employees, but often face uncertain cash inflows -for example they typically have few customers and if one or more of these customers delays payment the entrepreneur can face a funding shortfall. In order to cover these funding shortfalls and recognizing that they often lack collateral, entrepreneurs may be 1 The three most common forms of outside equity financing are angel investors, venture capitalists and corporate venture capital (Denis, 2004) . According to estimates from the National Venture Capital Association, the angel investor market was worth $100 billion and the venture capital market was worth $48.3 billion in 2000 (Denis, 2004) . There is less reliable data on the total amount of corporate venture capital investments, but it is thought to be a fraction of independent venture capitalist investments (Denis, 2004) . Most of the academic research on entrepreneurial finance has focused on these three sources of financing. willing to pay higher rates on borrowed capital in the short term. The importance of the availability of this type of capital to meet immediate needs is addressed in a recent study by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB). The NFIB asks small business owners to rank their most severe problems. Cash flow is ranked number seven, whereas obtaining long (5 years) and short ( 12 months) term business loans is ranked 68 and 70 respectively (see Barth, Yago and Zeidman (2005) for additional information). Hise (1998) reports that a survey by Arthur Andersen found that credit cards were a favored financing source for 34% of the entrepreneurs they contacted. Shermach (2004) argues that credit cards are used more widely by small business owners than other individuals. Cole et al. (2005) surveyed entrepreneurs between 2001 -2005 and found that credit cards were a source of finance for 37.5% of start-ups. These conclusions were drawn from small sample studies and no large sample analysis has been conducted to our knowledge. Despite the apparent practical importance of credit card financing, the role of credit cards in entrepreneurship has yet to be rigorously investigated, hampering our understanding of this important economic phenomenon.
Credit card companies compete for customers based on a variety of product characteristics, including interest rates (Stango, 2002) . Since the Marquette decision in 1978, the credit card companies have faced little regulation, and have been free to set interest rates depending on market conditions (Stango, 2003) . Assuming healthy competition between credit card providers and good enough information about individuals and their risk, credit card companies should extend credit to a wider variety of individuals as allowable rates increase. The implication for our work is that if credit cards are a mechanism that entrepreneurs can use for short term financing, a positive shock to the availability of such credit should increase the level of entrepreneurship. The effect should be especially pronounced for individuals that have difficulty obtaining credit through banks or other lending channels.
Prior work has found that blacks generally enter entrepreneurship at lower rates than whites (Fairlie, 1999) . Several explanations have been offered to explain this disparity, including family structure (Hout and Rosen, 2000) , liquidity constraints and consumer discrimination (Meyer, 1990) . Even after becoming entrepreneurs, black individuals face challenges in running a successful business. Robb, Fairlie and Robinson (2009) show that black entrepreneurs have trouble accessing external capital markets, and so tend to rely heavily on owner financing. Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) find that black-owned small businesses are more likely to be denied bank credit than other groups, and when they do obtain credit they pay higher interest rates. Other work (Borjas and Bronars, 1989; Meyer, 1990; Kawaguchi, 2004) has suggested that consumer discrimination may decrease the returns for black entrepreneurs. Ravina (2008) studies an online lending market and finds that, while black borrowers are as likely to obtain a loan as white borrowers, black borrowers pay significantly more basis points than white borrowers, even though delinquency rates are similar. The literature discussed herein linking black individuals and entrepreneurship indicates that blacks may have been less likely than whites to gain access to credit through standard lending channels. 3 Therefore, when interest rate caps were allowed to rise after Marquette, leading to an increase in credit cards, black individuals may have been more likely to use credit cards to finance entrepreneurial entry than whites.
In the next section, we discuss the Marquette decision. Section 3 describes our methods and data. Section 4 describes the main results: black individuals were more likely to transition into self employment if residing in a state that eliminated credit card interest rate caps. Section 4 also provides information about the role played by discrimination and by credit cards. Section 5 concludes and discusses implications from our analysis.
The Marquette Decision
In December 1978, the Supreme Court considered the case of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis vs. First Omaha Service Corp. The case centered around First Omaha"s marketing of credit cards to Minnesota customers. During this period, states were allowed to set their own caps on credit card interest rates, so First Omaha was charging a higher rate (as allowed by Nebraska law) than Minnesota based banks could offer to customers in their own state. As a result, the Minnesota Attorney General contended that these activities interfered with the state"s ability to enforce its own usury laws (Ellis, 1998) . The Court ruled that the National Bank Act stipulated that banks could charge the highest allowable rate in their home state, regardless of the interest rate caps in the customer"s state of residence (Ausubel, 1997; Ellis, 1998 According to some accounts, states removed interest rate caps in an attempt to attract and retain banks, and major banks like Citibank moved to high rate or no limit states such as South Dakota (Ausubel, 1997; Ellis, 1998 Since Marquette, credit card lending has increased and banks have extended more credit to high risk borrowers, since they can compensate for increased risk of default with higher rates of interest (Ellis, 1998) . For those with poor credit ratings or those who were discriminated against under the regulated system, the deregulation of credit card interest rates led to increases in the availability of credit. 
Data and Empirical Strategy
We hypothesize that access to high cost of capital financing is an important determinant of entrepreneurial activity. Our prediction is that higher credit card interest rate caps will lead to increased entrepreneurship, and that this effect will be especially pronounced among blacks. characteristics. More specifically, we use a differences-in-differences approach to compare self employment within states that adopt "no limit" regulation on credit card interest rates to self employment within states that do not adopt "no limit" regulation.
Data on interest rate caps for each state during our sample period have been hand collected from annual volumes of the Cost of Personal Borrowing in the United States. Figure 1 shows that the number of states with no limits increases from one to fourteen following the 1978
Marquette decision. We use two surveys on individual characteristics and employment for our analysis. We first use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1971-1975, 1977-1981, 1983-1985 7 to establish the link between changes in the maximum allowable credit card interest rate and self employment rates. The CPS is ideal for this analysis because it includes many variables that we use to control for alternative explanations. We then use the Survey of has information on credit card use; however, the SCF has few annual observations. The CPS data has many annual observations, but lacks personal financial information. Hence, our approach is to use data from both surveys. Where possible, we made every effort to collect similar individual characteristics across the two surveys. For both surveys, we restrict our observations to individuals who are between ages 18 and 65, who work full time, and who do not work for the military or on a farm. The main dependent variable is transition into self employment. Self employment is a commonly used to identify entrepreneurs, and is the best variable we have given the nature of the CPS data. 9 We identify transitions into self employment by restricting the sample to individuals who were employed full time in a wage paying job in the prior year. We also collect a number of individual characteristics that previous studies have shown are important predictors of self employment. These variables include indicators for black, female, married, home owner, urban, high school graduate and low-income (indicating household income is in the bottom 20 th percentile) as well as continuous variables for age and its square. 10 Several studies have found that interstate banking deregulation led to increases in entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009 ). We include four dummy variables indicating whether the state has passed any banking deregulation that may affect the availability of credit. These variables are dummies for deregulation of intrastate branching through M&A (merger restrictions), full intrastate branching (unit branching), interstate bank 9 It would be interesting to distinguish between self employed individuals who work in a single person firm versus self employed individuals who employ others. Nanda (2009) has a dataset that allows him to perform such a study, but we are unaware of any such dataset in the US that pre-dates the Marquette decision. 10 The results are robust to the exclusion of homeowner and income, the two variables that are most at risk of being endogenous to the self employment decision.
branching (interstate branching), and multi-state holding companies (holding company). The data on these deregulations come from Kroszner and Strahan (1999) .
The CPS and SCF data sources differ in several ways. With the CPS data, we construct demographic variables at the metro area-state level for unemployment and farm population.
From the SCF we use demographics at the county level which were collected from the 1980 census. Table 1 presents summary statistics of all variables used. Figure 2 uses the CPS data to plot black transition into self employment by year and by state type. State types are "no limit" if the state has eliminated credit card interest rate caps or "limit" if the state has not eliminated credit card interest rate caps. We note that there exist a lot of year to year fluctuations, perhaps relating to macro-economic factors or data collection. As a result, we include year dummies in all regressions. We also note that over time, black transitions into self employment appear to be rising in no limit states as compared to limit states.
The main specification is of the form: 11 We use the same county demographic values for each year in our sample, and because of the lack of county identification in the 1977 SCF we aggregate county level information to the primary sampling unit (PSU) level. 12 The results are robust to the use of weights.
(1) self employment imt = α + λ m + TIME t + β nolimit nolimit mt + β black*nolimit black*nolimit imt + X imt β + e imt X imt is a vector of individual characteristics (including a dummy for black), county demographics and state banking deregulations. The actual covariates depend on the survey used, and are described in more detail below. We include market (λ m ) and year (TIME t ) fixed effects.
Market is defined differently across regressions, but in most cases is at the metro area -state level. 13 For all regressions, we use the variable no limit to indicate whether the individual is located in a state that has no limit on credit card interest rates. 14 We expect that individuals who live in states that increase interest rate caps are more likely to transition into self employment, and so we expect β nolimit to be positive. We expect that black individuals who live in states that increase interest rate caps are even more likely to transition into self employment, and so we expect β black*nolimit to be positive.
Results

Effect of Changes in Interest Rate Caps on Transitions into Self Employment
We first use the Current Population Suvey (CPS) data to investigate the effect of interest rate caps on transition from a wage paying job into self employment. In Table 2 , we report the results of OLS fixed effects regressions with a dummy variable for self employment as our dependent variable. For convenience, coefficients on explanatory variables other than no limit and black*no limit have been suppressed. All results are clustered at the metro area -state level.
Column 1 includes personal characteristic information, 366 metro area -state fixed effects and 13 year dummies. The coefficient on black*no limit is positive and significant at the 5% level.
This result confirms our basic hypothesis. The coefficient on no limit is negative but insignificant. These results suggest that the switch to no limit on credit card interest rates was an important determinant of black transition into self employment. Columns 2 through 5 add in more fixed effects and interactions to examine how the coefficient on black*no limit changes.
Columns 2 through 5 include 145 industry fixed effects. These fixed effects are included to control for different financing needs across industries. For example, according to the FRB"s 1987
National Survey of Small Business Finance, the median starting capital in the construction industry was $9500, whereas the median starting capital in retail trade was $55,200. 15 Column 3 includes interactions between no limit and industry dummies to control for differential effects of the no limit legislation across industries. Column 4 includes interactions between black and industry dummies to control for the fact that black individuals may be more likely to work in certain industries. Column 5 includes both the interactions between black and industry dummies and between no limit and industry dummies. The results are remarkably consistent across the five columns: the coefficient on black*no limit is positive and significant whereas the coefficient on no limit is insignificant. The results in columns 1-5 show that black individuals who reside in a state with no limit on credit card rates and who were not self employed at t-1 are significantly more likely to enter self employment by time t than non-black individuals. In contrast, there is 15 NSSBF statistics cited in Hurst and Lusardi (2004) . 1987 is the earliest data for the NSSBF data.
no evidence that non-black individuals are likely to enter self employment after a state changes to no limit.
Other Law Changes
One concern with the positive results on black*nolimit is that there may be other contemporaneous state level changes which are driving the results, or other sources of endogeneity between the probability of self employment and the probability of a state becoming a "no limit" state. We first investigate the extent to which bank deregulation might be explaining the results. Black and Strahan (2002) , Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) and Kerr and Nanda (2009) all show that bank deregulation led to an increase in entrepreneurship. One might worry that states which were more likely to undergo bank deregulation were also more likely to switch to no limit. If that were the case, then the coefficient on black*no limit could be driven not by changes in credit card availability but instead by changes to bank competition. Dummy variables indicating whether a bank has deregulated were included in all regressions reported above to control for this possibility. Nevertheless, in Table 3 we report results of regressions that include both black*no limit and an interaction between black and each of the types of bank deregulations. The coefficient on black*no limit is positive and significant in all regressions, whereas the coefficients on the other interaction terms are not significant.
The results presented in Table 3 are important for another reason. We have contended above that the expansion in availability of credit cards would be more likely to affect black entrepreneurs because of the ability to avoid face-to-face interactions with lenders. The counterfactual test would be to show that expansion of availability of credit that requires face-to-face interaction would be no more likely to affect black entrepreneurs (or may even negatively affect black entrepreneurs). Hence, the fact that the coefficients on the interactions between black and the measures for bank deregulation are insignificant, small in magnitude, and negative in some cases provides additional support for our contention.
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We next focus on a specific type of state level change that may be affecting our results.
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Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (which went into effect in late 1979) which allowed individual states to create their own bankruptcy exemption levels, including unlimited exemption levels. 18 Using data sets from 1993 , Fan and White (2003 have shown that higher bankruptcy exemption levels are correlated with a higher probability of being self employed. In order to rule out that state bankruptcy exemption levels are driving the results, we create dummies for state "no limit" bankruptcy exemption levels and include these in similar regressions models to those shown in Table 2 . To create the no limit bankruptcy exemption variable, we use information on whether the state has any no limit bankruptcy exemptions from 
Between-State Moves
An additional source of concern may be that black would-be entrepreneurs are moving to no limit states to take advantage of credit card availability. In order to address this concern, we confirm that there is no significant difference between the share of black individuals before and after a state switches to no limit. Figure 3 depicts the results of a regression of black on dummy variables for 1-4 years before and after a state switches to no limit as well as a year dummies and metro area -state dummies. The figure shows that the share of black in a state does not significantly change in the four year window around the date of the state"s switch to no limit.
19 Fan and White (2003) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation data sets from 1993-1998. We further test this idea using data from the CPS on the demographics of individuals who move to no limit states. As depicted in Table 5 , there is no evidence that black individuals, or individuals transitioning into self employment, are any more likely to move from limit to no limit states. These results give us confidence that the effects we report in earlier tables are not driven by the propensity of would be black entrepreneurs to move to states which have recently switched to no limit.
Access to Finance and the Role of Race
In order to further understand the role of race in access to credit, we also investigate whether the impact of no limit differentially affects black individuals in states with a history of discrimination. To do this, we rely on historical institutional and legal details of the state. We first identify states which allowed slavery at the start of the Civil War (slave state) and states which were part of the Confederacy (confederate state). 20 A word of caution is necessary here.
We understand that there may have been other socio-economic considerations that determined whether a state was a Confederate or Union state in the Civil War, and certainly do not mean to imply that all individuals currently living in states which were part of the Confederacy a century ago are racist. Instead, the goal is to identify variation in institutions and norms across state types from a century ago. As other research has argued, initial conditions of institutions and norms in an area can explain variation across areas in later periods (Acemoglu et al, 2001 Collins (2004) . Table 6 replicates the regressions in Table 2 on transitions into self employment using CPS data, and splits the results by state type. Column (1) focuses on states that were not slave states immediately prior to the Civil War; the coefficient on black*no limit is 0.0054 and significant at the 10% level. Column (2) focuses on states that were slave states immediately prior to the Civil War; the coefficient on black*no limit is 0.0126 and significant at the 1% level. The results in these two columns suggest that black individuals residing in former slave states were more likely to transition into self employment following an increase in credit availability than similar black individuals in non-slave states. Columns (3) and (4) present results from splitting the sample into Confederate and non-Confederate states;
Columns (5) and (6) present results from splitting the sample into states with and without antimiscegenation laws in 1967; Columns (7) and (8) present results from splitting the sample into states with and without fair housing laws in 1968. We find similar results across all four of these measures for discrimination: black individuals residing in states with higher levels of discrimination were more likely to transition into self employment following an increase in credit card availability. This suggests to us that discrimination acts as a potential barrier to entrepreneurial entry.
The Role of Credit Cards in Self Employment
We finally use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data set to investigate whether credit cards were indeed the mechanism by which black individuals financed self employment.
It is important to point out that the SCF includes data on levels of self employment, not transitions into self employment, and that the SCF is a smaller dataset covering fewer states and years. Note from the summary statistics in Table 1 that about 25 individuals in the sample are black and self employed; this low number limits the power of any statistical analysis. In an appendix we present results using CPS data on levels of self employment and verify that the results found using the CPS data set in the prior section can be replicated using a smaller subsample that more closely resembles the sample found in the SCF dataset. In Table 7 , we present regression results from the SCF data set. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions, and results are clustered at the state level. In column 1 we verify the relationship between black*no limit and self employment that we found using the CPS data. The results show that increasing the state credit card interest rate cap to no limit negatively affects the probability of being self employed, and that black individuals living in a no limit state (black*nolimit ) have a significantly higher probability of being self employed. In columns 2-3 we investigate the effect of credit card ownership on self employment. To do this, we split the sample into individuals who own a credit card (column 2) and individuals who do not own a credit card (column 3). The coefficient on black*nolimit is positive and significant for the subsample that owns a credit card and positive but not significant for the subsample that does not own a credit card. We interpret this result as weak evidence that black individuals who own a credit card are more likely to be self employed if they live in a state with no limit on credit card interest rates.
While suggestive, the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant; 21 as discussed above, the lack of statistical power from the small amount of data in the SCF dataset is 21 The p-value in a two-tailed test is approximately 0.20.
unsurprising. A limitation to this approach is that while we observe credit card ownership, we do not have detailed data on credit card use, so we cannot ascertain whether individuals were actually using their credit cards to finance entrepreneurial activity as opposed to other nonbusiness activity. However, the SCF data do show that self employed individuals are more likely than non self employed individuals to own more credit cards.
22
Conclusion
No previous study to our knowledge has empirically documented how variation in credit card interest rates has influenced entrepreneurship across different demographic groups. This question is crucial, since prior work has documented that black individuals are more likely to face frictions when trying to obtain financing. The Marquette decision provides an exogenous shock to credit access by essentially deregulating the credit card markets in many states, allowing credit card companies to extend credit to new borrowers. We find strong evidence that black individuals were more likely to transition into self employment after a state switches to no limit, and weak evidence that black individuals with credit cards were more likely to be self employed. Consistent with Blanchflower et al (2003) , we offer qualitative evidence that black entrepreneurs face financial frictions when dealing with lenders. We link these results by
showing that, following a state"s switch to no limit, blacks are even more likely to transition into self employment if they are located in a state with (arguably) higher levels of discrimination. Our evidence is consistent with a scenario in which blacks face discrimination through regular 22 The 1983 and 1986 SCF data include information on the number of bank and general purpose credit cards owned by an individual. Based on data from over 4000 individuals, the average non self employed individual owns 0.9 credit cards; the average self employed individual owns 1.4 credit cards. We can reject the null hypothesis that these numbers are the same at the 99% confidence level. lending channels; this discrimination is a barrier to entry that results in higher finance costs.
Credit cards are a mechanism that black entrepreneurs can use to overcome this barrier because it does not require face-to-face interactions with a lender. While the result is especially pronounced for black entrepreneurs, there is no evidence of a similar effect for non-black entrepreneurs. We believe this is because credit cards allow black entrepreneurs to circumvent discrimination, or the fear of discrimination, when applying for financing in face-to-face settings.
There are several important limitations to our analysis. For the purposes of our empirical analysis, we assume that within state changes in credit card limits had an immediate effect on the rates offered to individuals with credit cards in that state, and that changes in rates of other states had little to no effect on the rates offered within state. Evidence from Knittel and Stango (2003) is consistent with this assumption, but further investigation of this assumption is warranted.
However, since our analysis compares states with large changes in rates to states with small changes in rates, this assumption means that any effect we find may have been attenuated from the actual effect. For example, while a state may have stayed at an 18% cap, and not adopted a "no limit" statute, some individuals in that state may be using out of state credit cards with much higher limits in later periods because the card was issued from a bank in a "no limit" state.
Hence, any difference in self employment or credit card use between such a state and a state that changes from an 18% limit to no limit will be lessened. The direction of this bias works against us finding a result. Another limitation is that while we treat the state"s switch to no limit as an exogenous shock following the Marquette decision, we cannot explain why some states switch to no limit and others do not, let alone predict when a state will switch to no limit. The worry is that a state"s switch to no limit and increases in black transitions into entrepreneurship may be endogenous. However, we believe it unlikely that states are switching to no limit because black entrepreneurs or black would-be entrepreneurs who are credit constrained are lobbying for such a law change at the statehouse. We base this belief in part on the fact that the text of the Marquette decision does not discuss the effect of credit cards on black entrepreneurs.
In the current study, due to data limitations, we cannot directly observe AfricanAmerican entrepreneurs obtaining credit cards after the Marquette decision and then using those cards in turn to finance entrepreneurial ventures. We instead rely on several pieces of evidence that suggest that this scenario occurred. We should point out that there may be another, demandrelated, explanation for our results. Namely, it could be the case that the increased availability of credit cards to African Americans leads to increased spending by African Americans on goods and services sold by firms owned by self employed African Americans, which in turn leads to the creation of more firms owned by self employed African Americans. 23 However, the fact that entrepreneurs own more credit cards than non-entrepreneurs is suggestive evidence against the demand-related explanation.
Our results have several implications for the academic literature and public policy. First, this work makes a significant contribution to the empirical work on financing of entrepreneurship since it is one of the few studies to focus on credit cards, one of the most important financing tools used by entrepreneurs. Oswald (1998), Fairlie (1999) , Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) , and Nanda (2009) all demonstrate that wealth constraints hinder entrepreneurship and that shocks that remove these constraints lead to higher entrepreneurship. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Petersen and Rajan (2002) , on the other hand, argue that wealth constraints are likely small. In particular, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that the probability of entering self employment is broadly similar across most of the wealth distribution. It is possible that these contradictory results may be related to inattention to the relative importance of different types of financing. While individuals may in fact be financially constrained in some respects, access to mechanisms such as credit cards may soften these constraints, which may help explain the broad results reported in Hurst and Lusardi (2004) .
While prior research has focused on venture capital financing, our paper provides a more representative view of how entrepreneurship is financed in the United States. In doing so, we have demonstrated that variation in credit card interest rates influence entrepreneurial entry, most likely because credit card companies extend more credit when rates are uncapped. This effect is most pronounced among individuals who were most likely to be denied credit prior to the increase in rates, namely black individuals. Thus, our results support the notion that public policies can have a significant impact on black self-employment rates as found by others. Chatterji, Chay, and Fairlie (2009) 1971 -1975 , 1977 -1981 ,1983 -1985 . SCF Sample includes 1977 , 1983 , 1986 and excludes DC, HI, ID, KS, MD, MT, ND, NH, NM, NV, RI, VT, WV, WY. *From the 1980 Census for the SCF sample; constructed from data for the CPS sample. SCF Dataset CPS Dataset N = 420, 416 N = 5117 Table 2 uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Cost of Personal Borrowing to examine the effect of increases in credit card interest rate caps ("no limit") on transitions into self employment at t from a wage paying job at t-1. The positive coefficient on black*no limit indicates that increases in credit card interest rate caps increased the probability of black transition into self employment. This result is robust to the inclusion of a number of fixed effects for geography and industry.
Summary Statistics of Variables in Datasets
(1) Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) to examine the effect of increases in credit card interest rate caps and bankruptcy exemption limits on the probability of self employment. The positive coefficient on black*no limit credit card rates indicates that increases in credit card interest rate caps increased the probability of black to be self employed. The insignificant coefficient on black*no limit bankruptcy exemption indicates that increases in no limit bankruptcy exemptions had no effect on the probability of black individuals to be self employed. This result suggests that contemporaneous state level changes are not driving the strong result on black*no limit reported in Table 2 (1) 1971-1975, 1977-1981,1983-1985 Table 7 uses the SCF dataset and seeks to understand whether credit cards were the mechanism that facilitated black entry into self employment following the increase in state interest rate caps.
(1) 1977, 1983, 1986 . Robust standard errors in brackets; clustered at state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Figure 1:
Source: The Cost of Personal Borrowing in the United States Figure 1 shows the increase in state interest rate caps following the Supreme Court"s Marquette Decision in 1978. By 1986, 14 states had no limit on interest rate caps, up from one (New Hampshire) pre-1978. The states which became no limit during this time period are: Arizona (1980), Delaware (1981 ), Idaho (1983 , Illinois (1981) , Montana (1981 ), Nevada (1981 ), New Jersey (1981 ), New Mexico (1981 , Oregon (1981 ), South Dakota (1981 , Utah (1982 ), Virginia (1983 ), Wisconsin (1981 . 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Number of
States
Number of States with No Limit on Credit Card Rates Figure 2:
Source: Current Population Survey 1971 Survey -1975 Survey , 1977 Survey -1981 Survey , 1983 Survey -1985 Figure 2 shows the percentage of black individuals who transition from a wage paying job at t-1 into self employment at t by state type. 1971-1975, 1977-1981, 1983-1985 Figure 3 shows the changes in black population in a state for four years before and four years after the state becomes a no limit state. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Changes in share of black individuals, pre and post the state becoming no limit yes to the question, and this result is statistically significant at the 1% level. Taken together, the results of answers to these questions suggest that black individuals encountered frictions, or believed they would encounter frictions, in their access to financing. However, because of the way the questions were asked, we cannot distinguish if the frictions were primarily from lenders requiring face-to-face interactions, or lenders such as credit card companies which did not require such interactions. It is worth noting that Blanchflower et al (2003) , using Survey of Small Business Finance data from 1993 and 1998, report similar qualitative findings that blackowned firms are more likely to report being concerned about credit market problems and less likely to apply for credit because of fear of being turned down.
